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Long Swings in Financing of Capital Formation
Introduction
IN the preceding chapter we discussed the alternations in the rates of
additions to or growth of real flows (capital formation, national prod-
uct) and population. The procedures employed were simple, and the
significance of the findings should not be exaggerated. In particular,
no claim is made that these alternations are periodic, or that we know
the mechanism that produces them. But whether we use moving aver-
ages or averages for reference or specific cycles to eliminate the effects
of fluctuations associated with business cycles, the resulting totals do
not display uniformly constant, uniformly accelerating, or uniformly
decelerating rates of growth. The growth rates are for a period above
or for a period below the underlying long-term trend, and the mag-
nitude of these deviations above or below the underlying trend line
is too large to be disregarded. Hence the need for segregating these
alternations in rates of growth for separate study, and their designation
as long swings is a semantic facility that should not mislead us into
ascribing to these movements an unwarranted connotation of regislar
periodicity.
Two arguments against treating this component separately should
be faced. The first points to the fact that over the last forty to fifty
years the timing and characteristics of the long swings were much
affected by the two world wars. The latter caused the deep troughs in
residential construction and materially affected the structure of both
capital formation and national product. Furthermore, while the major
depression of the 1930's was an even more important factor in setting
the trough of the last long swing, it in turn reflected in good part theLong Swings
dislocations World War I produced in this country and elsewhere. It
may, therefore, be argued that, at least since 1914, long swings have been
largely a result of world wars; and it is hardly justifiable to treat these
long swings as an aspect of economic growth dissociated from what
are major incidents in international relations. In considering this
argument, we cannot deny that world wars put a distinctive stamp on
the long swings in rate and structure of economic growth. But this
means only that when such wars occur, they modify the dates and
affect the amplitude of the long swings compared with what they might
have been otherwise. It does not mean that had there been no world
wars there would have been no long alternations in the rate and
structure of growth. They occurred in this country between the
1880's and 1914, and for some aspects of the economy can be seen in
the record of economic growth between the 1830's and the Civil War.
Any consideration of the bearing of the analysis of past trends upon
even a future assumed to be warless must take account of the finding
that, over the period covered by the record, the rates of secular growth
for some major aspects of the economy (construction, additions to pop-
ulation, internal migration, and others to be discussed below) have
been subject to long alternations even during decades of peace.
The second argument relates to the statistical procedure employed in
Chapter 7 and to be followed here. The use of moving averages cov-
ering a long period—such as a decade—introduces a semblance of long
continuous swings even when no such continuity characterizes the
underlying data. A big change, such as a pronounced cyclical expan-
sion followed by a mild contraction, or an especially severe depression,
or a large annual bulge or trough—each transient in the sense that it
may characterize just one or two or three years—will, in the calculation
of a ten-year moving average, raise or depress the ordinates of that
average over the ten successive items in which it is included. The con-
tinuous swings in our charts may, therefore, be statistical illusions.
Given the procedure employed, all that is needed to produce those
swings, apparently, is the occurrence, at roughly equal intervals, of an
exceptionally large transient change, upward or downward.
The formal validity of this argument cannot be denied: transient
changes of unusual magnitude may, when smoothed by a long-period
average, produce apparent long swings. But it does not follow that,
where moving averages reveal long swings, the latter are necessarily
due to the "stretching out" of a few large transient changes. The under-
lying detailed data may, in fact, without any averaging, reveal long
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swings which, with their wide amplitude, dominate the shorter-term
fluctuations associated with business cycles. In such cases the moving
averages yield a picture of long swings less affected by the short-term
fluctuations in the more detailed data, but they in no sense create the
continuous long-term alternations in the rate of growth. And for sev-
eral important components of economic activity the annual data do
reveal the long swings suggested above: gross and net immigration to
this country; annual increments in population for the recent periods
(since 1930), when they are not derived by linear interpolations between
census dates; nonfarm residential construction; expenditures on dur-
able capital equipment (cOnstruction and producers' durables) in many
of the regulated industries; additions to capital in manufacturing in-
dustries; and changes in the annual balance of international payments.
Even when the amplitude of long swings relative to that of short-
term fluctuations is not so dominant that such swings can be observed
clearly in the annual (or more detailed) time series, the emergence of
long swings after the series have been averaged for successive cycles or
smoothed by means of long-period moving averages is not necessarily
a statistical illusion. Two somewhat distinct cases can be considered.
In the first case we assume that the economic process measured in
the series fluctuates within a fairly narrow range, the fluctuations being
combined with an underlying secular movement of any magnitude. If,
then, a sharp upward change occurs during a given year, and no off-
setting change follows immediately, the smoothing of the underlying
data by, say, a ten-year moving average will lift the level of the average
over a ten-year period. The rise will be followed by a drop in the sixth
year following that of the assumed large upward change (if the average
is centered at the mid-point). The semblance of a continuously high
level for ten years, followed by a continuously lower level—the effects
of the underlying long-term trend being allowed for—is, then, an illu-
sion, in that the series was above the secular level for one year, not
ten. But is such a hypothetical 'example consistent with what we must
assume concerning the operation' of the economic system? We would
ordinarily expect the economic process to respond to a sharp dis-
turbance by canceling it, if that disturbance does not correspond to the
underlying determinants.If, by some accident, the output of a
commodity rises steeply above its secular level, •we would expect, all
other conditions being equal, a relative decline in prices of that com-
modity, a subsequent fall in output in response to the price decline,
and the emergence of deviations below the secular level that would
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offset the original upward disturbance. The inference would apply to
an equal degree in the case of a sharp downward break in output. And
if the economic process reacts to this annual bulge or trough, either
would affect a moving average for only a year—not for the full decade
involved in the period of cumulation. It is only if we conceive the
transient changes as purely random, that is, assume independence
among successive values, that the moving average will produce the
statistical illusion we are considering. In the case of economic time
series, in which we expect a deviation from an underlying secular
movement to produce an offsetting effect, there is no such independence
among successive deviations(i.e.,the serial correlation coefficient
among irregular changes should be significantly negative). Therefore,
the emergence of long swings in a decadal moving average cannot be
reduced to what is essentially a stretching out of random transient
changes. In a situation in which at intervals there is an upward or
downward change not offset by an immediate reaction in the opposite
direction, the long-term swings in the original data may be viewed as
genuine because of the very absence of an immediately offsetting
reaction.
The same logic applies to the other case—a more realistic one—where
we recognize the existence of cyclical fluctuations in the underlying
detailed data, but assume that one of the cycles is exceptionally severe
or exceptionally mild. To produce the effect of a long swing, such
severity or mildness must refer to an imbalance between expansion and
contraction. In other words, because of a contraction exceptionally
severe in relation to the preceding or following expansion or an ex-
pansion exceptionally pronounced in relation to the preceding or fol-
lowing contraction, the average for the cycle as a whole is below or
above the long-term secular level. If we can conceive successive cycles
as units of a random universe—assume no significant correlation be-
tween the deviation of a given cycle average from the underlying secu-
lar trend and the deviation of the preceding or next cycle from that
trend—a moving average may generate long swings that are statistical
illusions because of the stretching out of a single deviation of a cycle
average from the long-term level.
Here again, however, assuming such independence—randomness—
of successive cycle averages means an implicit denial of the significance
of the underlying secular trend as a reflection of forces setting a path
of movement for the economic process, to which it will tend to return
when disturbed. If a given cycle is above the secular average, we would
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expect the next cycle to be below the secular average, and vice versa.
This does not mean that the negative serial correlation should be per-
fect; but it does mean that, in the absence of significant forces working
to the contrary, negative correlation should be the rule, and disturb-
ances capable of generating a long swing through moving averages
should be few and far between.
The major point for both cases can be put somewhat differently.
The responsiveness of economic processes to short-term disturbances,
which bars conceiving them as purely random changes (whether such
randomness be applied to annual or cycle-average values), means a
significant negative correlation between the successive values. Given
such negative correlation, the probability that moving averages will
generate long swings as statistical illusions becomes much less than
in cases where we deal with truly random changes. This must be taken
into account in considering the justification for segregating the long
swings for separate study, along with the fact, noted previously, that
in many important components of national product and capital forma-
tion the long swings are conspicuous even before short-term fluctua-
tions are reduced by means of cycle averages or moving averages.
These somewhat technical arguments having been dealt with, we
now consider long swings in the financing of capital formation. The
financing processes are far more volatile than the real flows discussed
in the preceding chapter, and the effects on them of wars and busi-
ness cycles are far more prominent. It may seem at times that long
swings are statistical artifacts far removed from reality, which fluc-
tuates so widely in the short run. In a sense this impression is true:
if the annual or cyclical ups and downs are violent, the resulting aver-
ages and trends are more in the nature of fiction than they are if the
short-term fluctuations are within a narrow compass and the long-term
movement dominates the picture. But this does not render completely
unreal the movements that transcend in duration the more violent
cycles or other short-term fluctuations—so long as we have institutions
(and there are many) that survive the cycles and that adjust in their
response and planning to periods beyond the next cyclical expansion
or contraction. Therefore, just as we attempted to establish the long-
term trends in financing (in Chapters 5 and 6), despite the fact that
those trends are quantitatively limited relative to the short-term
fluctuations of the financing ratios in the course of business cycles or of
war periods, so we must consider the long swings in at least some financ-
ing ratios.
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•Unfortunately, few direct data are available except for recent decades
in which wars dominate the picture and when the conclusions are too
obvious to warrant discussion. The two world wars, of course, had an
immediate effect on the structure of countrywide financing, with the
major shifts from equity to debt and from private to government debt.
Just as clearly, the postwar prosperity periods affected the ratio of in.
ternal to external financing, and of debt to equity financing. Much of
the material in Chapters 5 and 6, where we had to select periods similar
with respect to position in the long swings in order to make inferences
concerning underlying trends, is in fact relevant here, and need not be
repeated. Our main interest should be in the earlier decades, which
were not so markedly affected by wars and their aftermath, but for
which direct information on financing of capital formation is quite
scarce.
Under the circumstances, we must resort to indirect evidence. The
next two sections present several types of such indirect evidence. The
final section gives actual examples relating to swings in financing
ratios for selected sectors of the economy—examples borrowed from the
monographs in this series that deal with the capital using sectors.
•The Structure of Capital Formation, in Current Prices
One type of indirect evidence on long swings in financing is provided
by the data on changes in the components of capital formation, in
current prices. The bearing of those changes may be stated as follows.
We assume that, by and large, it is capital formation that gives rise to
financing—particularly external—and in fact we are interested in how
capital formation was financed, not in the general use of credit funds.
If, then, there are distinct and persistent differences in the way the
several components of capital formation are financed, changes in the
proportional share of such components in total capital formation
should give rise to changes in the proportional magnitude of various
types of financing. For example, if we assume that, by and large, in-
ventory accumulation is financed by short-term borrowing, whereas ac-
cumulation of fixed durable capital is financed either by internal funds
or by long-term external funds with the proportions of the two assumed
constant, shifts in the distribution of capital formation between in-
ventory accumulation and accumulation of fixed capital will produce
corresponding changes in the apportionment of total financing between
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internal and external, and within external, between short-term and
long-term.
The qualifications attached to such tying of types of capital forma.
Lion to distinctive sources of financing were discussed in Chapter 5.
For the present it suffices to say that the connections between types of
capital formation and their financing, while not close and absolutely
CHART14
Structure of Gross Capital Formation in Current Prices, by Category of.User,
1869—1955
aShore of business firms (including net changes
In foreign claims when positive)
bShare of households (nonform residential construction)
CShare of governments
invariant,are sufficiently realistic so that if there are marked long
swings in the distribution of capital formation among its components
(all in current prices, because the current price volumes are more di-
rectly tied in with financing than the constant price volumes are), and
if the components are marked by persistent differences in the structure
of financing, there will result long swings in the distribution of total
financing of capital formation among different sources.
It is this rationale that underlies the presentation of the data in
Charts 14 through 16. In Chart 14, we show the percentage apportion-
ment of total gross capital formation (including military construction
and munitions, and excluding net changes in foreign claims when





































construction (used preponderantly by private households), government
capital formation (comprising government construction and muni-
tions), and business capital formation (which, being a residual, in-
cludes farm and nonfarm, corporate and noncorporate, as well as net
changes in claims against foreign countries when positive). Chart 15
shows the percentage apportionment of gross domestic business capi-
CHART15
Structure of Gross Domestic Business Capital Formation
Type of Capital Good, 1 869—i 955
aOther" construction
bPraducers' durables
CNet changes In inventores
in Current Prices, by
tal formation, by type of capital good: construction, which in this case
excludes nonfarm residential and government construction;pro-
ducers' durable equipment; and net changes in inventories. Chart 16
shows, for durable domestic business capital formation, the proportion
of estimated capital consumption to gross volumes. In all three charts,
the percentage shares are based on ten-year moving averages of totals
in current prices, centered on the fifth year.
The first point to be noted is that long swings in the various aspects
of the structure of capital formation in current prices are quite promi-
nent, even before the second half of the period, which is marked by
world wars and their aftermath. This is what we would have expected
from the discussion, in Chapter 7, of the volumes in constant prices.
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But relative price movements might well have exhibited long swings
inversely related to those in real volumes, i.e., to those in constant
prices. If they had, the distributions of the totals in current prices
would not have shown long swings. That the swings do emerge means
either that the swings in relative prices were not inverted to those in
real volumes or, if inverted, were of far narrower amplitude.
CHART16
Capital Consumption as Per Cent of Gross Durable Domestic Business Capital
Formation, 1869—1955
U"Other" construction and producers' durables
bProducers' durobles
c'Other" construction
Toillustrate the implications of Charts 14—16 for long swings in the
structure of financing, we give, for selected years, the actual percentage
shares shown in the three charts (Table 69). The basis for selecting
the years differs somewhat from chart to chart, but in general, the in-
tent was to choose those that marked the points of greatest difference
in the structure of capital formation—the years in which the lines
shown in the charts either converged most or diverged most. For Chart
14 this end was attained by choosing the turning points in the share of
nonfarm residential construction; for Chart 15 the choice was based
largely on the turning points in the shares of construction and of net
changes in inventories; for Chart 16 the dates are those of turning
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STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL FORMATION, CURRENT PRICES, SELECTED YEARS, 1871—1955
A. PERCENTAGE SHARES IN TOTAL GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION,9 BY CATEGORY OF USER
Year Households b GovernmentsBusiness Firms
(1) (2) (3)
1. 1876 15.7 3.8 80.4
2. 1888 27.9 4.2 67.8
3. 1902 16.8 5.6 77.6
4. 1909 18.5 7.9 73.6
5. 1915 9.6 13.4 77.0
6. 1926 22.1 13.6 64.2
7. 1940 8.1 48.2 43.7
8. 1950 16.5 20.8 62.8
B.PERCENTAGE SHARES IN GROSS DOMESTIC BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION,BY




Year Construction Durables Inventories
(1) (2) (3)
9. 1875 39.0 30.0 31.1
10. 1884 44.4 35.5 20.1 -•
11. 1892 58.8 29.5 11.7
12. 1901 52.6 33.1 14.3
13. 1910 51.7 37.7 10.6
14. 1918 32.4 46.3 21.3
15. 1928 44.4 57.3 —1.6
16. 1938 23.3 63.1 13.7
17. 1950 30.7 61.2 8.1




(1) (2) (3) (4)
18. 1875 54.4 60.9 57.2 39.5
19. 1884 65.8 62.3 64.2 51.3
20. 1902 48.5 65.3 55.1 47.7
21. 1917 94.1 80.1 86.1 68.7
22. 1925 79.7 64.4 71.1 66.0
23. 1940 189.5 83.2 111.4 100.6
24. 1950 82.1 79.8 80.6 74.0
Percentages and ratios are based on ten-year moving averages of annual volumes
centered on the fifth year.
aIncludingnet changes in foreign claims when positive.
b Nonfarm residential construction.
(Notes on following page)
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NoTEs TO TABLE 69
SOURCE: Based on the annual series underlying, or shown in, the following tables:
PART A
Gross capital formation: Table R-29, col. 1, and Table R-34, col. 3.
Households (nonfarm residential construction): Table R-30, col. 1.
Governments: Table R-30, cola. 2 and 3, and Table R-6, col. 4.
Business firms: gross capital formation minus nonfarm residential construction and
government capital formation.
PART B
Gross domestic business capital formation is the sum of the following:
"Other" construction: from Table R-30, col. 1.
Producers' durables: from Table R-33, col. 1 and Table R-6, col. 4.
Net changes in inventories: Table R-34, col. 1.
PART C
Gross domestic business capital formation is the same as for part B.
Capital consumption:
"Other" construction: Table R-31, col. 4.
Producers' durables: Table R-33, col. 2, and Table R-6, col. 6.
points in the long swings in the ratio of capital consumption to the
total of construction and producers' durables.
Using the percentage shares in Table 69, we attempted some calcula-
tions that would illustrate the effects on the structure of financing. In
Tables 45 and 46, total uses for the business sector for the first decade
of this century were about 1.4 times gross capital formation, the cor-
responding ratio for government was 1.5, and that for nonfarm resi-
dential construction, 1.0. For the same decade, the proportion of in-
ternal financing (gross retention) to total uses was 0.59 for business,
about 0.5 for government, and 0.65 for nonfarm residential construc-
tion. Let us assume that the ratio of total uses to gross capital forma-
tion for the earlier decades was the same as that for 1901—1910 (or
1900—1909), but that the ratio of internal financing to total uses was
0.5 for business, 0.5 for government, and 0.7 for nonfarm residential
construction. On this assumption the countrywide proportion of
gross retention to total uses for 1876 would be [(80.4 x1.4)X 0.5] +
[(3.8 X 1.5) x0.5]+ [(15.7 X 1.0) X 0.7] divided by (112.6 + 5.7 + 15.7),
or 0.52. A similar calculation would show a fraction of 0.54 for 1888,
and 0.53 for 1902. In other words, the proportion of internal financing
to total uses increased somewhat from the trough of the nonfarm resi-
dential construction cycle to the peak and then declined again to the
trough. If, in general, nonfarm residential construction is characterized
by a high ratio of internal financing to total uses, the long swing of
its share in the total will, ipso facto, mean a corresponding long swing
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in the share of internal financing in the countrywide total of uses of
funds.
The changes in the share of internal financing (gross retention) in
total sources (uses) derived above to illustrate the implication of the
first long swing in Chart 14 may seem quite small. But it must be re-
membered that we deal here with large sectors, and that the assumed
difference among them in the share of internal financing in total
sources is not large. If we had assumed that the share for nonfarm resi-
dential construction was 0.8 instead of 0.7, and that for business was
0.4 instead of 0.5, the long swing in the proportion of internal financing
to total would have been more prominent.
Similar illustrations can be devised for the other aspects of the
structure of capital formation in current prices in Charts 15 and 16.
If we assume that net changes in inventories are all financed by short-
term borrowing, and that the other elements in gross domestic business
capital formation are financed half by external long-term financing
and half by gross retention, the ratio of total internal financing to
gross business capital formation would rise from 0.345 in 1875 to 0.44
in 1892; and of the 0.655 share of external financing in 1875, 0.344
would be long-term and 0.311 short-term; whereas in 1892, of the 0.56
of external financing, 0.44 would be long-term and 0.12, short-term.
(All of the figures are calculated from part B of Table 69 relating to
Chart 15.) Finally, if we can assume that, by and large, capital consump-
tion charges are earned, the entries in part C of Table 69 show the
swings in one major component of the share of internal financing in
total.1
The purpose here is not to assign precise values to the links between
the long swings shown in the three charts (and in the underlying data)
and the implicit long swings in the structure of financing (total or busi-
ness alone). It is rather to suggest the links by which the observed
long swings in the distribution of capital formation in current prices
among components can generate long swings in the structure of financ-
ing. Given the hypotheses concerning the association between type of
1Thetotals of capital consumption underlying Chart 16 and part C of Table
69 should be not reproduction values (as they are) but original cost—if they are
to correspond to customary practices of business accounting. But one may argue
that when, because of price rises, reproduction cost is higher than original cost, the
use of the former allows for the associated rise in accounting net profits, with an
opposite allowance in periods of declining prices and of replacement cost below
original cost. At any rate, for illustrative uses the difference is not important, and
the extra calculations involved in securing capital consumption charges based on
original cost did not seem worth while.
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asset and uses and type of financing, such long swings will be gen-
erated unless there are offsetting movements in the proportions of
various sources of financing for each sector distinguished. There is,
however, no reason to expect such offsetting movements.
Price and Yield of Securities
Another body of indirect evidence that can shed some light on long
swings in financing, and indeed on those in real flows, is the price and
yield of securities. In Chart 17 we show nine-year moving averages of
the longest available series on the price of stocks, for major industrial
groups and for all stocks, and in Table 70 we record the turning points
of the long swings in the index for all stocks, and measure within
these phases the changes in each of the four stock-price indexes.
Three observations are suggested by the evidence. First, for at least
two of the stock groups (railroad and utility) prices show marked long
swings, of sizable amplitude, and averaging about twenty years in
duration. The swings in the index of prices of industrial stocks are
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TABLE 70
CHANGES IN STOCK PRICES DURING PHASES OF LONG SWINGS
IN THE PRICE INDEX FOR Au. STOCKS, 1871—1956
(index, 1926 =100)
TotalRailroadUtilitiesIndustrial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a Firstor last year included in all series.
Indexes are based on nine-year moving averages of annual series and are centered on
the fifth year.
SOURCE, ANNUAL SERIES
1871—1937: Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789—1945, Series N-215—N-218.
1938—1956: Extrapolated from 1937 by the Standard and Poor series, splicing by the
average ratio for 1935—1937. Series are given in Business Statistics, 1957
Biennial Ed. (Supplement, Survey of Current Business), p. 101.
much less clearly marked, and are not apparent until the early 1880's.
The index for all stock prices (weighted by the volume of all stock
issues) shows clear and prominent swings. In other words, we find


















A. INDEXES OF STOCK PRICES AT DATES OF TURNING POINTS IN COLUMN 1








9. Trough to peak
10. Peak to trough
11. Trough to peak
12. Peak to trough
13. Trough to peak
14. Peak to trough
15. Trough to peak
B. CHANGES PER YEAR DURING SUCCESSIVE PHASES
(line 1 to line 2) +0.90+1.19
(line 2 to line 3) —0.51 —0.78
(line 3 to line 4) +2.19+3.55
(line 4 to line 5) —0.68 —2.62
(line 5 to line 6) +4.94+2.75
(line 6 to line 7) —3.68 —7.51











































C. CHANGES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE PHASES
16. Trough to trough (line9 to line 10)—1.41 —1.97
17. Peak to peak (line 10 to line 11)+2.70+4.33
18. Trough to trough (line 11 to line 12)—2.87 —6.17
19. Peak to peak (line 12 to line 13)+5.62 +5.37
20. Trough to trough (line 13 to line 14)—8.62—10.26
21. Peak to peak (line 14 to line 15)+10.56 +9.29Financing of Capital Formation
of some types of productive activity and in additions to population,
but also in stock prices, where they presumably reflect the general esti-
mate of the long-term prospects of growth and growth profits.
Second, the timing of the long swings in the index of prices for
all stocks is close to that in gross national product, flow of goods to
consumers, and population-sensitive capital formation (see Table 66).
The first observable trough was in 1875 (and it may well have been in
1873, as was the case with gross national product); the first peak was
in 1885, between that for gross national product (1882) and that for
population-sensitive capital formation (1890); the next trough was in
1894, a year after the trough in gross national product but in advance
of the trough in population-sensitive capital formation. From then on
the coincidence has been quite close.
Third, Table 70 suggests and Chart 17 confirms the impression that
before World War I there was significant divergence in the long swings
among the three groups of stocks. The railroad stock prices moved in
closest conformity with the general index, and hence in closest con?
formity with the real flows represented by national product. The util-
ity stock prices moved somewhat differently in that they showed a
trough in 1886—1887 (whereas the general index did not reach a trough
until 1894), and a peak in 1902 (much earlier than the peak in the gen-
eral index), perhaps reflecting the phase of the fastest growth of the
nonrailroad utilities. We have already noted that the industrial stock
prices failed to show a significant upswing until the early 1880's, and
that upswing extended to the early 1890's rather than to the middle
1880's (the trough in the index of prices for all stocks). Departures
from the common pattern during the period affected by World War I
can be explained by the differential effect of war and inflation on the
prices of stocks in sectors like railroads and utilities which were re-
stricted by price regulation, compared with the industrial group in
which profits were unrestricted. The discrepancies in timing of the long
swings in the earlier periods must have been associated with differences
in the timing of the swings in rates of growth of the sectors involved. In
other words, just as in Chapter 7 we found that before World War I
the long swings in the components of national product differed in tim.
ing (particularly as between the population-sensitive and other ele-
ments in capital formation), so we find here the long swings in stock
prices for various sectors diverging before World War I. The data,
however, do not permit us to trace specific associations between long
swings in stock prices and in real flows for individual sectors.
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All of this, while of some interest for what it adds to the picture
of long swings in economic activity, has only a remote bearing upon
financing. Alternations in the prices of stocks do not necessarily mean
similar movements in the use of new stock issues for purposes of
financing, either in absolute terms or relative to the use of other credit
instruments or of internal financing.
There is, however, a way to suggest the bearing upon financing. From
series on stock prices and on dividend payments we can calculate stock
yields—the ratio of dividend payments to the current price of stocks.
This ratio does not necessarily reflect the actual cost of new stock issue
money to corporations that use this means of financing their capital
expenditures, because the price at which a new security can be mar-
keted may be different from that of extant issues, and the current pay-
ment of dividends is not necessarily the minimum price that has to
be paid for marketability of a new issue. However, barring disturbances
such as wars (when other circumstances affect the yield of stocks and
its relation to prices of new stock money), we can assume that the long.
term movements in stock yields do approximate fluctuations in the
cost of equity money to corporations. We may, then, compare stock
yields with bond yields and argue that if the difference in favor of
bond yields increases (if bond yields are increasingly lower than stock
yields), there should be, other conditions being equal, a shift in the
distribution of new issues in favor of bonds, and the opposite effect
should be found if the difference in favor of bonds decreases. Hence,
if there are long swings in the stock-bond-yield differentials, there
should be corresponding long swings in the distribution of new issues
between stocks and bonds.
This is the rationale for the comparison in Chart 18. Line a is a
nine-year moving average of the difference between yields of railroad
stocks and of high-grade twenty-year bonds, adjusted for maturity. It
does not go beyond 1937, because the subsequent averages begin to
reflect the abnormal interest rates and bond yields of World War II,
and also because for the last decade for which we have data on new
railroad security issues (1940—1949), both stocks and bonds declined.
If we had an annual series on net bond and stock issues of railroads
from which we could compute the nine-year moving average of the
ratio of the former to the latter, we would expect it to move as the
ratio in line a moves. However, our data on net bond and stock issues
for railroads are easily available only for the long periods covered in
Ulmer's monograph. In Table 71 we have taken them gross of invest-
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CHART18
Average Differential between Yie'ds of Bonds and of Raikoad Stocks Com-
pared with Average Ratio of Net Bonds to Net Security Issues of Railroads,
1871—1 941
aDifference between yields of bonds and of railroad stocks
(9—year moving averages)
bDifference between yields of bonds and of railroad stocks
(annual averages, selected periods)
CRatio of net bonds to net security issues, railroads
(selected periods)
ment in affiliated companies (because such investment is not appor-
tioned between stocks and bonds) and we also show the ratio of net
bond issues to total net security issues (line c in the chart, drawn by
connecting the mid-points of the six periods distinguished). To facili-
tate comparison, we also calculated annual averages of the stock-bond-
yield differential for the same periods (line b in the chart).
With one exception—the movement from 1880—1890 to 1893—1907—
the correspondence is what we would have expected. The differential
in favor of bonds (column 1) rises from 1893—1907 to 1907—1916 and
further to 1914—1920, and over these two intervals the ratio of bonds
to total issues (column 5) rises from 57 per cent to well over 100 per
cent. The differential declines from 1914—1920 to 1921—1930 and still
further to 1931—1937 (which we take to represent the decade of the
1930's, excluding the effects of World War II), and the ratio of net
bonds to total net security issues declines precipitously. The only ex-

















AVERAGE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN YIELDS OF BONDS AND OF RAILROAD STOCKS
COMPARED WITH AVERAGE SHARE OF NET BONDS IN NET SECURITY
IssuEs OF RAILROADS, SELECTED PERIODS, 1880—1940
Per Centof Total Sources (Uses)
Total
Average Net Net Net (3)
Yield Stock Bond Issues as %
Period DifferentialIssues Issues(2) + (3)of(4)
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.1880—1890 0.30 43.0 54.9 97.9 56.1
2.1893—1907 0.10 47.5 63.8 111.3 57.3
3.1907—1916 0.89 35.0 60.1 95.1 63.2
4.1914—1920 1.38 —3.0 36.5 33.5 109.0
5.1921—1930 1.05 14.8 37.1 51.9 71.5
6.1931—1940 0.52 11.9 —22.6 —10.7—189.9 a
Col. 3 as percentage of col. 2 (because coi. 4 is negative).
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1) Obtained by subtracting bond yields from railroad stock yields, and then
averaging (weighting terminal years according to number of months cov-
ered by census data) for the years indicated. For line 6, the average relates to
1931—1937 only, because later ordinates of the nine-year moving averages re-
fleet the World War II years with their artificially low bond-yield rates. The
bond and stock yield series are from the following sources:
Bond Yield Series: 1900—1952, from Historical Statistics of the United States,
1789—1945, and Continuation to 1952, Series N-199. Extension through 1955
is by the series of corporate bonds, 20-year maturity, given in Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States, 1956, Table 551, p. 466. Extension back through
1880 is from Frederick R. Macaulay, Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by
the Movements of interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States
since 1856 (New York, NBER, 1938), Table 5, col. 3, pp. Al 11-112. The series
for best five bonds is used without splicing, inasmuch as the difference be-
tween the series in 1900—1902 is too small to call for any adjustment.
Stock Yield Series: 1880—1937, from Historical Statistics, Series N-208.
1938—1955 is the Standard and Poor series in Statistics; Security Price index
Record, 1957, pp. 100—103. The series were not spliced inasmuch as the over-
lapping figures for 1937 were close, although those for 1936 differed consider-
ably.
(2). to (4) Gross of investment in affiliated companies. The data are from Melville J.
Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities: its Forma-
tion and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960), Table 46, p. 150.
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in favor of bonds declined from 1880—1890 to 1898—1907. While the
comparison is necessarily crude, because so few long periods can be
used, it does corroborate the responsiveness of the bond-stock ratios to
bond-stock-yield differentials. The long swings in the latter can be
assumed, therefore, to produce long swings in that aspect of the
structure of financing.
A somewhat more telling comparison can be made for mining and
manufacturing corporations, but only for the years since 1900. Here
we calculate the differential between the yields of industrial stocks
and those of high-grade twenty-year bonds (the bond yield index used
in the comparison for railroads). Nine-year moving averages of this
differential appear in Chart 19, in this case through World War II and
later years. We compare this series with the ratio of net bond issues to
net stock issues (stocks are used as the denominator rather than total
net security issues to minimize the number of periods with negative
CHART19
Average Differential between Yields of Bonds and of Industrial Stocks Com-
pared with Average Ratio of Net Bond to Net Stock Issues of Manufacturing
and Mining Corporations, 1896—1955
aDifference between yields of bonds and of Industrial
stocks (9—year moving averages)
bRto (/,l of net bond to net stock issues
(averages for successive business cycles)
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bases), the ratio being averaged for the successive business cycles, posi-
tive and inverted. The underlying entries, for the mid-point of each
cycle, appear in Table 72. Both lines in Chart 19 describe long cycles:
a downward phase from 1900 (or 1902) to either 1912 or the end of
1916; then an upswing to a peak either in the middle of the 1910—1920
decade or at the beginning of the 1920's; a trough in either the early
or the mid-1930's; and an upswing to the 1950's. Also, there is rough
positive correspondence between the two lines—in accordance with the
hypothesis advanced here—although the bond-stock ratio tends to
lag behind the bond-stock-yield differentials. The major exception
occurs during the years of World War I which are marked by exceed-
ingly large excesses of stock over bond yields, the war having caused a
rise in profits and dividend payments of industrial corporations far
beyond the rise in market prices of the securities. One could argue that
in those years stock yields were far above the minimum needed to
attract more money into new securities, and—in terms of our hypothe-
sis—the yield differentials were substantially exaggerated. If one were
to lower correspondingly the nine-year moving averages of the yield
differentials centered in 1913—1917, the trough in the differentials
might well come closer in time to the trough in the bond ratios, and
the peak in the differentials would be in 1920. But whether or not such
ad hoc reasoning is justified, the conclusion remains that there is
broad similarity in the long swings in the stock-bond-yield differentials
and in the distribution of new issues between stocks and bonds.
It would have been useful to apply the same kind of analysis to the
cost of all external financing relative to internal, to ascertain whether
there were long swings in the differentials and corresponding long swings
in the distribution of total financing between internal and external.
But we would need measures of the possible yields on funds from in-
ternal sources if invested elsewhere relative to the possible costs of
external funds. Even if we had adequate measures of the latter, the
estimation of the former would be extremely hypothetical. All we can
do at present is to indicate the susceptibility of differentials in yields
of various types of credit instruments to long swings, and to suggest
that they may be productive of similar swings in the structure of
financing, given no offsetting movements on the demand side. And
with this suggestion we turn to the limited direct evidence on long-
term alternations in financing ratios for selected capital using sectors.
8oTABLE 72
AVERAGE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN YIELDS OF BONDS AND OF INDUSTP.IAL STOCKS
COMPARED WITH RATIO OF NET BOND TO NET STOCK Issuas Op
MANUFACTURING AND MINING CORPORATIONS, SUCCESSIVE BUSINESS CYCLES, 1900—1953




Successive Net issues Centered
Business Cycles Mid-Point Per Year on Year









1. 1899—1903 1901.5 167 249 149.1 1.98
2. 1900—1904 1902 158 254 160.8 2.05
3. 1903—1907 1905 132 124 93.9 1.24
4.1904—1908 1906 143 113 79.0 1.07
5. 1907—1910 1908.5 164 124 75.6 0.84
6. 1908—1911 1909.5 177 140 79.1 0.75
7. 1910—1913 1911.5 224 104 46.4 1.32
8. 1911—1914 1912.5 212 59 27.8 1.35
9. 1913—1918 1915.5 295 70 23.7 2.24
10. 1914—1919 1916.5 410 78 19.0 2.29
11. 1918—1920 1919 878 182 20.7 1.00
12.1919—1921 1920 815 427 52.4 0.41
13. 1920—1923 1921.5 442 406 91.9 0.53
14. 1921—1924 1922.5 385 283 73.5 0.60
15. 1923—1926 1924.5 529 224 42.3 0.53
16.1924—1927 1925.5 569 304 53.4 0.53
17.1926—1929 1927.5 953 55 5.8 0.07
18. 1927—1932 1929.5 733 —146 —19.9 0.38
19.1929—1937 1933 259 —249 —96.1 0.58
20.1932—1938 1935 174 —249 —143.1 0.72
21.1937—1944 1940.5 133 —26 —19.5 2.71
22. 1938—1946 1942 234 —28 —12.0 2.54
23. 1944—1948 1946 798 548 68.7 1.99
24. 1946—1949 1947.5 810 1,125 138.9 2.66
25. 1948—1953 1950.5 707 1,394 197.2 3.52
26. 1949—1953 1951 691 1,437 208.0 3.55
Average covers 1900—1 903.
SOURCE,BY COLUMN
(2) and (3) From Daniel Creamer,Sergei Dobrovolsky, and IsraelBorenstein, Capital
in Manufacturing and Mining: its Formation and Financing (Princeton for
NBER, 1960), Table 51, pp. 162—163.
(5) Obtained by subtracting bond yields from industrial stock yields and then
averaging for the business cycles indicated, terminal years being given half
weight. The series on bond yields is identical with that used for col. I of
Table 71, and the stock yield series is from the sources indicated in the
notes to that table.
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Financing Ratios for Selected Capital Using Sectors
Agriculture is the first sector for which we can observe fluctuations over
time in the ratios of various sources of funds to capital formation (in
this instance comprising not only fixed capital and inventories but
also changes in cash working balances). The question to be explored is
whether the proportions of various sources of funds to the total of
CHART20
Ratios of Various Sources of Funds to Real Capital Formation Plus Cash Work-




dChanges in loans and book credit
RutLo
capitalformation so financed exhibit any long swings. The relevant
ratios are presented in Chart 20 and in Table 73.
One major difficulty with the data for agriculture is that they are
for quinquennia—time units too long and too crude for an adequate
portrayal of long swings whose duration may average not more than
twenty years. But even with this qualification, the ratios in question
do not change uniformly in one direction, although on balance there
is a strong indication of an underlying trend. Thus, by and large, the
trend in the proportion of gross retention (internal financing) to capi.
tal formation is upward, and in that of loans and book credit down-
ward—conclusions suggested in our discussion in Chapter 5. But the
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TABLE 73
RATIOS OF VARIOUS SOURCES OF FUNDS TO REAL CAPITAL FORMATION
PLUS CASH WORKING BALANCES, AGRICULTURE, SUCCESSIVE QIJINQUENNIA, 1900—1949
Changes in Changes in
Capital ChangesDebt toChangesTotal Loans
Consump- Gross in Banks and in and
tion NetRetention MortgageFederalOtherBook Credit
AllowancesIncome(1) + (2)CreditAgenciesDebt(4)+(5)+(6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1.1900—1904 0.51 0.26 0.77 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.28
2.1905—1909 0.60 0.16 0.76 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30
3.1910—1914 0.53 0.14 0.67 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.37
4.1915—1919 0.57 0.04 0.61 0.38 0.19 0.19 0.76
5.1920—1924 1.79 —1.38 0.41 0.59 —0.18 —0.21 0.21
6.1925—1929 0.86 0.10 0.96 0.14 —0.03 —0.03 0.08
7.1930—1934 2.00 —0.12 1.88 —0.08 —0.67 —0.33 —1.08
8.1935—1939 0.67 0.41 1.08 0.01 0.08 —0.01 0.08
9.1940—1944 0.57 1.20 1.77 —0.13 0.01 —0.03 —0.16
10.1945—1949 0.68 0.34 1.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.15
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
SOURCE: Alvin S. Tostlebe, Capital in Agriculture: Its Formation andFinancingsince 1870
(Princeton for NEER, 1957), Table 36, pp. 137 and 138. Real capital formation is the
sum of fixed capital and changes in inventories.
ratio of gross retention to capital formation, which declined slightly
from 1900—1904 to 1920—1924, thereafter appears to have gone through
two swings with peaks in the first half of the 1930's and in the quin-
quennium affected by World War II. In both these periods capital for.
mation was relatively small, and reliance on internal financing was
forced either by tightness in the supply of external funds (during the
depression) or by abundance of earned funds (during World War II) or
by lack of need for net additions to capital.
Long swings in the ratio of gross retention to total capital formation
become more prominent when we distinguish between the capital
consumption and net income components of gross retention, with the
ratio of capital consumption inverted to that of net income. Finally,
for the proportion of external financing to capital formation we find
one long swing with a peak during World War I and a trough in the
early 1930's, and what appears to be the beginning of another long
swing.
To be sure, the world wars and the major depression of the 1930'sLong Swings
put their marks on the fluctuations we have been noting, through their
effects on prices, on the availability of credit funds, and on the supply
of capital goods. But long swings in prices, in output, and in cost and
ease of credit funds existed even during the periods when there were
no world wars. According to Table 73, there was an up-and-down
swing in the ratio of capital consumption to capital formation even
from 1900—1904 to 1910—1914. Moreover, war and threats of war, if they
affect the financing ratios so profoundly and over such long periods,
should not be neglected in consideration of the future.
One other point concerning the movement of the financing ratios is
to be noted. The ten quinquennia covered in Table 73 permit us to
observe nine changes. For real capital formation plus cash working
balances, seven of these are rises and two declines. By and large, the
change in the ratio of gross retention to capital formation tends to
be inverted to the change in capital formation: the signs differ in six
of the nine comparisons. A downward movement in capital forma-
tion brings with it a rise in the internal financing proportion, and
vice versa. The opposite is true of external financing, with seven agree-
ments in sign out of the possible nine. In other words, an upward swing
in capital formation is accompanied by a rise in the external financing
proportion, and a downward swing, by a decline. This is what we
would expect in the course of the short-term fluctuations associated
with business cycles, and there is no reason for the association to be
different in the longer swings. While the data on agriculture hardly
permit us to test this hypothesis thoroughly, they do suggest it; and
we should refer to it in considering the other sectors.
The data on financing ratios for all corporations in mining and
manufacturing, which also extend back only to 1900, are somewhat
better, because—though rough—they are annual, and we can calculate
the averages for successive business cycles.2 The ratios based on these
averages are plotted in Chart 21 and given in Table 74. The difficulty
here is that on the uses side of funds, continuous estimates are avail-
able for plant and equipment expenditures alone (excluding net
changes in inventories and financial assets).
The ratio of gross retention (unadjusted for changes in inventory
valuation and differences between original cost and replacement bases
of capital consumption allowances) to plant and equipment expendi.
2 Here we Omit the overlapping inverted units (peak to peak) and use only the
positive business cycles (trough to trough), which are sufficient to reveal the long
swings.
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CHART21
Financing Ratios for Manufacturing and Mining Corporations, Successive Busi-
ness Cycles, 1900—1953
aRatio of gross retention to plant ond equipment
expenditures
bRatio ot net security issues to gross retention
cRatio of net bond to net stock issues
Ratio
turesfor averages for successive business cycles (centered at the mid-
point of each cycle) reveals two long swings with peaks in the two
world wars. And yet other changes (as the peak in the 1920's) clearly
suggest such swings even for periods without wars.
The average volume of plant and equipment expenditures by min-
ing and manufacturing corporations, unlike the average volume of
capital formation in agriculture, shows such a strong upward trend
that only three of twelve changes are declines. However, if we count
as a decline any change of less than a given minimum (in this case
20 per cent from cycle to cycle), we can distinguish five declines and
seven rises. With this we can compare changes in the ratios of gross
retention (internal financing) and of net security issues to plant and
equipment expenditures.° In eight of the twelve changes, the move-
ment in the ratio of gross retention is opposite to that in capital ex-
8Theratio of net security issues to plant and equipment expenditures is given
in Daniel Creamer, Sergei Dobrovoisky, and Israel Borenstein, Capital in Manu-
facturingand Mining:Its Formation and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960),
Table 40, p. 121; and its movement is somewhat similar to that shown in Chart 21
and Table 74 for the ratio of net security issues to gross retention.•Long Swings
TABLE 74
FINANCING RATIOS FOR MANUFACTURING AND MINING CORPORATIONS,
SUCCESSIVE BUSINESS CYCLES, 1900—1953
Gross Retention Net
Dates of as Per Cent ofSecurity IssuesNet Bond
Successive Mid-Points Plant andas Per Cent ofIssues as









1.1900-1904 1902 89.5 57.3 160.8
2.1904—1908 1906 77.9 32.8 79.0
3.1908—1911 1909.5 90.2 33.0 79.1
4.1911—1914 1912.5 92.8 24.6 27.8
5.1914—1919 1916.5 153.7 15.6 19.0
6.1919—1921 1920 82.4 55.7 52.4
7.1921—1924 1922.5 108.8 29.3 73.5
8.1924—1927 1925.5 118.3 28.9 53.4
9.1927—1932 1929.5 57.7 44.5 —19.9
10.1932—1938 1935 68.4 —6.2 —143.1
11.1938—1946 1942 150.3 4.3 —12.0
12.1946—1949 1947.5 116.6 19.8 138.9
13.1949—1953 1951 107.5 19.2 208.0
SOURCE: Given in or calculated from Creamer, Dobrovoisky, and Borenstein, Capital
in Manufacturing and Mining, Tables 40 and 51, pp. 121 and 162—1 63.
penditures; in nine of the twelve, the movement in the ratio of net
security issues is positively associated with that in capital expenditures.
As in agriculture, but in application to what might be called long-term
financing relative to long-term capital expenditures, the long swings
in internal financing ratios are negatively associated with, and the
long swings in external financing ratios positively associated with, the
long swings in capital formation volumes.
The data in Chart 21 and Table 74 relate to net security issues and
fixed capital investment alone. But the finding of positive association
between long swings in the external financing ratios and those in the
volume of total uses (and negative association of the latter with long
swings in the internal financing ratios) is confirmed by Dobrovolsky's
analysis of the data for samples of large manufacturing corporations,
for which reference cycle averages can be computed for years beginning
with 19l4. Of eight changes in cycle-to-cycle (positive cycles only)
4!bid.Table M-l, pp. 454 and 455, and Table 80, p. 320.
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averages of annual volume oftotal financing, six are rises and two
declines; and the changes in the ratio ofexternal financing (short-term
and long-term) to total uses are in agreement seventimes out of eight.
Thus, one may conclude that the associationssuggested above between
the long swings in external-internalfinancing ratios and in volumes
of total financing hold not only for long-termfunds relative to fixed
capital investment but also for total fundsrelative to total financing.
Line c in Chart 21 (column 4 in Table 74) relates tothe distribution
of external financing between stocks and bonds,discussed in connection
with Chart 19. The ratio of net bond issues to netstock issues reveals
a long swing, roughlysimilar to the swing in the ratio of net security
issues to either internal financing or durablecapital expenditures: a
drop to the World War I cycle, a rise to the1920's, a sharp decline to
the 1930's, and then another rise to the recentperiod. The explanation
of this movement, in its connection with theindustrial bond-stock-
yield differentials, was suggested above.
The last sector for which we can observe long swingsin the financing
ratios is nonfarm residential construction. Thedata for Chart 22 are
annual series taken directly from the Grebler, Blank, andWinnick
CHART22
Expenditures on New Nonform Residential ConstructionCompared with Ratio







aExpenditures on new nonfarm residential
construction (including land)
bRatio l%) of equity funds to total
expenditures
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monograph.5 The two series are new residential construction ex-
penditures, and the ratio of equity funds to total expenditures. The
complement of the latter ratio is, of course, the ratio of external funds
(predominantly mortgages) to total expenditures, in this case, total
uses (sources) of funds.
To be sure, the proportion of equity funds is an estimate based on
scattered sources, and is not an exact record (in the usual sense of the
word) of the flow of funds. Nevertheless, the evidence of long swings in
this ratio of equity funds to total financing, combined with its generally
downward trend, is quite significant. Furthermore, the swings are di-
rectly inverted to those in the volume of total expenditures—gross
capital formation in this sector. During the 1920's when the long swing
in nonfarm residential construction was in the up-phase, the ratio of
equity funds declined and that of external financing rose; the same
happened during the rise from 1933 to 1941 and during the recent rise
(since World War II). By contrast, during the decline from the mid-
1920's to the mid-1930's, the ratio of equity funds rose and that of ex-
ternal financing declined. The only exception to this inverse correla-
tion between swings in internal financing ratios and in capital forma-
tion (or positive correlation of the latter with swings in external financ-
ing ratios) occurred during the few years of World War II, when a
greatly reduced volume of nonfarm residential construction was ac-
companied by a decreasing ratio of equity funds and hence a rising
ratio of external financing. This resulted from the special character
of residential construction during those years (only housing needed
for war workers being permitted), which warranted extension of credit
and militated against the use of equity funds.6
Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Resi-
dential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects (Princeton for NBER, 1956).
6"Onlyduring World War II, when new residentia' construction was limited to
housing for war workers and practically all of its debt financing was under the spe-
cial liberal terms for FHA-insured mortgages, did the ratio fall below 25 per cent."
Ibid., p. 182.
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